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Multilevel selection is an important organizing principle that crucially underlies evolutionary
processes from the emergence of cells to eusociality and the economics of nations. Previous studies
on multilevel selection assumed that the effective higher-level selection emerges from lower-level
reproduction. This leads to selection among groups, although only individuals reproduce. We
introduce selective group extinction, where groups die with a probability inversely proportional to
their group fitness. When accounting for this the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is substantially lowered.
Because in game theory and evolutionary dynamics the degree of cooperation crucially depends on
this ratio above which cooperation emerges previous studies may have substantially underestimated
the establishment and maintenance of cooperation.
The evolution of cooperation within and between
species has been a puzzling phenomenon since the early
beginnings of the theory of evolution. Despite the com-
petition between individuals and their selfish struggle for
survival, cooperation between individuals emerged in all
areas of life, which is sometimes termed “the problem of
cooperation” [1].
The problem of cooperation is commonly described in
the framework of evolutionary game theory where indi-
viduals participate in a game whose outcome influences
their success in the population over time [2]. In these
games individuals have the choice to either cooperate
or defect. This choice then includes a social dilemma:
defectors always win against cooperators, but the total
payoff for the players is higher if they both cooperate. A
variety of mechanisms were proposed that contribute to
the evolution of cooperation in the context of this social
dilemma [1, 3]. A strong promoter for cooperation can
be the structure of a population itself, allowing for the
emergence of clusters of cooperators [4–8], including the
potentially beneficial effects for cooperation if the popu-
lation structure changes over time [9].
The idea that competition between groups can lead
to the establishment of cooperation under evolutionary
selection pressures can be traced back to Darwin, who
argued that group selection will occur when the benefits
of cooperation or altruism between subpopulations are
greater than the individual benefits of egoism within a
subpopulation [10]. In fact, the success of cooperation
on the group level seems to be witnessed at all levels
of biological or social-economical organization. This ap-
plies especially in the context of humans which show high
cooperation towards members of the same (political, reli-
gious or other) group and are strongly adverse to different
groups [11]. Following Maynard Smith, group selection
requires that groups be able to ”reproduce”, by splitting
or by sending out propagules, and that groups should go
extinct [12]. An early mathematical foundation for mul-
tilevel selection was laid by Wright in 1945 [13].
Evolutionary theory suggests, however, that for a
whole group to get a single trait, it must spread through
the whole group first by regular evolution. Therefore
group and kin selection are not always independent con-
cepts [14–18], and kin selection [14, 19] or reciprocation
[3] (or other concepts different from group selection) can
dominate the evolution of cooperation [20]. Whether or
not, and when, kin and group selection are equivalent
concepts crucially depends on the assumptions made and
even on the mathematical description [18, 21–26] which
both have been controversially debated in past years [27–
30].
In this paper we introduce selective group extinction
and study the consequences for the establishment and
maintenance of cooperation in evolutionary dynamics
for a minimal set of assumptions. Specifically, selec-
tive group extinction might play an important role in
situation of direct competition between groups like war,
famines or other events where the survival of the whole
group is at stake [11].
Specifically, we study selective group extinction based
on a simple stochastic model for group selection by
Traulsen and Nowak [6] (referred to as the TN model
thereafter). The TN model is based on the assumption
that groups die independently of the fraction of coop-
erators in the group and it enables the evolution of al-
truism in populations where the individuals compete in
a prisoners dilemma game but without reciprocation or
kin selection. The advantages that cooperating groups
are expected to have by utilizing coordinated efforts to
outcompete groups of selfish individuals may not be ig-
nored. This calls for a certain direct form of selective
group extinction, independently of the absence - or pres-
ence - of other important mechanisms that promote coop-
eration in structured populations by direct competition
[31]. In particular, since cooperator groups emerge and
persist due to advantageous intra-group cooperation and
get necessarily evolutionary unstable when cooperation
is lost, we drop the assumption of fitness-independent
group extinction [31–33].
So we suggest selective group extinction, where groups
2Figure 1: (Color online) Model. The whole population of
individuals is divided into M groups (here M = 3). Individ-
uals are reproduced according to a fitness which is calculated
from the payoff in an evolutionary game between the individ-
uals in each group. One individual is chosen stochastically
according to its fitness and reproduces; the offspring is placed
in the same group with probability 1 − λ (event 1), or mi-
grates with probability λ to a randomly chosen group (2). If
a group exceeds the maximum size N , either one randomly
chosen individual of the group dies with probability 1 − q
(3) or the group divides with probability q (4). At a group
splitting event (4), all individuals are randomly distributed
into two groups and one group is chosen for elimination with
probability inversely proportional to the group fitness fg.
die with a probability inversely proportional to their
group fitness. Specifically, we assume the group fitness
to be a linear function of the fraction of cooperators in
the group, which enables us to quantify the effect an-
alytically for certain limiting cases. Perhaps most im-
portantly, we demonstrate a rather substantial impact of
selective group extinction on the critical benefit-to-cost
ratio above which cooperation emerges.
MODEL
The prisoners dilemma is played between two individ-
uals who have a choice between cooperate (C) or defect
(D): If both players cooperate they get the reward R; if
both defect, they receive the punishment payoff P ; If one
of the players defects while the other cooperates, the de-
fecting player gets the temptation payoff T and the other
player gets the sucker’s payoff S. The classical prisoners
dilemma requires T > R > P > S. Rational choice thus
leads the two players to both play defect even though
each player’s individual reward would be greater if they
both played cooperate. In equilibrium, each individual
chooses to defect even though both would be better off
by cooperating, hence the dilemma.
To further stress the problem of cooperation, we use
a common alternative parametrization for the prisoner’s
dilemma: cooperators pay the cost c to generate the ben-
efit b for the other player, while defectors do not pay a
cost and do not generate a benefit. Thus the game is
characterized by the payoff matrix for player A
(player B→player A↓ C D
C R = b− c S = −c
D T = b P = 0
)
In order to achieve analytic insights, we use the stan-
dard parametrization of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (other
choices do not change any of the main results). We
assume that individuals are either C or D and do not
change their behavior over their life span. If they repro-
duce, the offspring has the same behavior as the ancestor
which means that individuals reproduce via cloning. The
whole population is divided into M groups with a group
size limit N . The individuals compete in their respective
groups via the prisoners dilemma game. The evolution
of the population is determined by the following events
(Fig. 1):
Reproduction: According to its fitness one individual is
randomly chosen to produce an offspring. The fitness of
a cooperator or defector in a group of i cooperators and
n− i defectors with selection strength w (0 ≤ w ≤ 1) is
given by [34]:
fC(i) = 1 + w − w
R (i− 1) + S (n− i)
n− 1
fD(i) = 1 + w − w
T i+ P (n− i− 1)
n− 1
(1)
The offspring is placed in the same group (with probabil-
ity 1 − λ) as the ancestor and shares the same strategy.
Migration: With probability λ the offspring of the re-
produced individual migrates into another group which
is also randomly chosen.
Group splitting: If the group size exceeds a given thresh-
old N via reproduction or migration, one individual in
this group will die with probability 1 − q, or with prob-
ability q the group splits up. All individuals of the split-
ting group are randomly divided into two new groups.
No empty groups are allowed. To keep the number of
groups in the population constant, one group is chosen
for elimination afterwards.
Selective group extinction: The doomed group is chosen
with probability inversely proportional to its group fit-
ness
p†g = f
−1
g /
∑
j
f−1gj (2)
where the index j runs over all groups and we choose the
group fitness fg to be linearly dependent on the fraction
of cooperators in the group,
fg =
i fC(i) + (n− i) fD(i)
n
. (3)
Definition Eq.(3) fulfills the following requirements: (i)
fg is a function of both the fraction of cooperators in
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Figure 2: (Color online) Impact of group number and
group size on (b/c)⋆. Comparison of the critical benefit-to-
cost ratio (b/c)⋆ of our model with the model of Traulsen and
Nowak [6]. In (a) the group size is fixed at N = 10 and in (b)
the number of groups is M = 10. Numerical simulations with
group splitting probability q = 10−3 and selection strength
w = 0.1 agree perfectly with the theoretical results of Eq.
(7). For both (a) and (b) our model exhibits a substantially
lower critical benefit-to-cost ratio and hence a larger benefit
for cooperators.
the group i/n and the fraction of defectors in the group
(n− i)/n, (ii) fg = fC for groups with only cooperators,
(iii) fg = fD for groups with only defectors, and (iv) the
group fitness fg is dependent on the selection strength
w. This ensures that for w = 0 the fitness is identical
for all groups, whereas for w = 1 a maximum fitness
difference between homogeneous cooperator groups and
homogeneous defector groups is guaranteed.
RESULTS
To measure for which parameter regimes cooperation
can emerge, we determine the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
(b/c)⋆ by comparing the fixation probability of one coop-
erator in the population of defectors ρC and the fixation
probability of one defector in the population of coopera-
tors ρD. At b/c = (b/c)
⋆ both strategies have the same
fixation probability. If the benefit-to-cost ratio is above
this critical limit, cooperation is advantageous, while be-
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Figure 3: (Color online) Impact of migration on (b/c)⋆.
Comparison of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (b/c)⋆ against
the migration rate λ of our model with the TN model. Numer-
ical simulations with group splitting probability q = 10−3 and
selection strength w = 0.1 agree perfectly with the theoreti-
cal results of Eq. (7). Our model exhibits a higher robustness
against migration.
low this limit defection is the profitable strategy.
Consideration of certain limiting cases allow for ana-
lytical results [6]. In particular, we consider a low group
splitting probability q ≪ 1 and small migration rate
λ ≪ 1. This leads to a separation of timescales be-
tween the processes inside a single group and the group
splitting events between different groups. Therefore our
model becomes a two-level Moran process [35, 36] with
fixation of single individuals in a given group in the first
level and then fixation of a homogeneous group among
all other homogeneous groups on the second level. Note
that for similar models, but without group splitting, the
requirement for small migration probabilities can be re-
laxed while still allowing for analytical results [37–39].
However, these models do not include direct competition
between groups or a certain group fitness.
Given the update rules, we calculate the transition
probabilities to jump from j to j + 1 or from j to j − 1
pure cooperator groups, respectively. For the jump from
j to j+1 cooperator groups it is calculated by the proba-
bility that a cooperator group splits (dependent on single
individuals fitness) multiplied with the probability that
a defector group dies (dependent on group fitness) plus
the probability that the offspring of a cooperator group
migrates and takes over a defector group.
Pj,j+1 =
fC(N)j
(fC(N)j + fD(0)f(M − j))
×(
q
fC(N)(M − j)
(fD(0)j + fC(N)(M − j))
+ λϕC
(M − j)
M
)
Pj,j−1 =
fD(0)(N − j)
(fC(N)j + fD(0)(M − j))
×(
q
fD(0)j
(fD(0)j + fC(N)(M − j))
+ λϕD
j
M
)
(4)
4Here the variables ϕC and ϕD are the fixation probabil-
ities for C and D individuals in a single group and are
identical to Ref. [6]:
ϕC =
1
N
[
1−
w
6
δC
]
ϕD =
1
N
[
1−
w
6
δD
] (5)
with δC := [(T −R+ 2P − 2S)N + (T − 4R+ 2P + S)]
and δD := [(−2T + 2R− P + S)N − (T + 2R− 4P + S)].
From the transition probabilities, Eq. (4), we derive
the fixation probability for cooperator groups [6, 36],
ΦC =

1 +M−1∑
k=1
k∏
j=1
Pj,j−1
Pj,j+1


−1
(6)
For small selection strength w we can Taylor expand the
expression for group fixation atw = 0 [55] and then arrive
at an analytical expression for both ΦC and ΦD:
ΦC =
1
M
[
1− w
M − 1
2
Γ
]
, ΦD =
1
M
[
1 + w
M − 1
2
Γ
]
with
Γ := P −R +
N
Nq + λ
(
−q(R− P ) +
λ
6N
(δC − δD)
)
.
From small group splitting probability q ≪ 1 and small
migration probability λ≪ 1 we can assume that in case
of a group splitting event the individual groups all have
size N and are either completely cooperating or defect-
ing. To get the overall fixation probabilities ρC and ρD
for single individuals in the whole population we there-
fore take the product of the fixation probability of one
individual in the group and the fixation probability of
this cooperator or defector group in the whole popula-
tion, ρC = ϕCΦC and ρD = ϕDΦD.
Cooperation is advantageous, if ρC is larger than ρD
with the critical benefit-to-cost limit given by ρC = ρD.
For arbitrary N and M , but under the given constraints
of small group splitting probability q, low migration prob-
ability λ and small selection strength w, we eventually
derive the critical benefit-to-cost ratio,
(b/c)⋆ = 1 +
N/M + λq
(2 − 3/M)− λq /(NM)
. (7)
For zero migration, λ = 0, which corresponds to per-
fect separation of groups and no noise in strategies, Eq.
(7) reduces to to the simpler (b/c)⋆ = 1 + N/M(2−3/M) . For
the asymptotics N ≫ 1 and M ≫ 1 (and λ constant) we
obtain
(b/c)⋆ = 1 +
N/M + λq
2
. (8)
We have tested our analytical predictions for the crit-
ical benefit-to-cost ratio by numerically determining the
point where from evenly mixed population cooperators
and defectors take over the whole population with the
same frequency. Specifically, we used a nested interval
method to find the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for each
parameter set of N , M and λ. Our simulations are in
excellent agreement with the theory (Figs. 2 & 3; error
bars give the first and the third quartile, respectively).
DISCUSSION
The combined selection at birth and death of groups
[40] considerably favors cooperation, as it promotes the
selective advantage of homogeneous groups of coopera-
tors. This results in a significantly lowered critical limit
of the benefit-to-cost ratio (b/c)⋆ as a function of N , M
(Fig. 2) and λ (Fig. 3) above which cooperation is ad-
vantageous.
Similarly to the results of Traulsen and Nowak [6] the
critical benefit to cost ratio increases linearly with groups
sizeN and decreases inversely to the number of groupsM
(Fig. 2). However, the critical ratio of benefit over cost,
above which cooperation emerges and is maintained in
the population, is significantly lower; in the limit of large
group sizes N the critical ratio (b/c)⋆ is approximately
half. This means that with selective group extinction co-
operation is advantageous for group sizes twice as large
as in the TN model or for half the number of groups.
Correspondingly, with the same population structure N
and M a much lower (b/c)⋆ can be chosen, allowing co-
operation to emerge for a broader range of altruistic acts.
The population size can play a decisive role in evolu-
tionary dynamics [34, 41]. In our model, the difference
in the critical benefit-over-cost ratio (b/c)⋆ between our
model and the TN model [6] behaves differently for the
varying number of groups M or varying group size N .
For no migration the difference is
∆(b/c)⋆ =
N(M − 1)
(M − 2)(2M − 3)
∝
N
M
(9)
which effectively increases linearly with N and is in-
versely related toM . For increasing number of groupsM
the difference between the TN model and selective group
extinction decreases due to similar extinction probabili-
ties of homogeneous groups after group splitting events:
If there is only a single homogeneous cooperator group
among many defector groups, one of the defector groups
will die with a high probability anyway, even without the
effect of higher fitness of the single cooperator group with
selective group extinction, whereas for for a low number
of groups selective group extinction protects this coop-
erator group from extinction. For increasing group size
N , on the other hand, the difference in (b/c)⋆ increases
5since with selective group extinction the fitness of defec-
tor groups is greatly reduced. For large group sizes defec-
tors overtake a single group with a much higher probabil-
ity than cooperators, resulting in the steep linear increase
of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio with group size N .
However, for defectors to fixate in the population, they
also need to spread through the population via group
splitting events; with selective group extinction this is
much harder as homogeneous defector groups are more
likely to die which greatly diminishes the benefit of large
groups for defectors.
Again similar to the TN model, successful evolution of
cooperation requires a low probability of migration λ/q
(cf. Eq. 8) and hence strongly separated groups. In par-
ticular, given a fixed group splitting probability q, (b/c)⋆
diverges at λd = qN(2M−3) (Fig. 3) and reaches already
twice the (b/c)⋆ as without migration if λ2× ≈ q × 1.664
for both N and M equal to ten. Therefore it is advan-
tageous to hinder the invasion of individuals into groups
and thus prevent group mixing. Generally, group selec-
tion models are highly vulnerable against migration of
defecting individuals [6], as single defectors can easily
overtake cooperator groups. This is also true for other
structured population models [42, 43]: if the number of
random links between individuals becomes too large, the
benefit for cooperation decreases, even though some mix-
ing is always required to allow for successful fixation in
a population. Accordingly also the different forms of mi-
gration can be crucial to the evolutionary dynamics in the
population [44]. If for very high migration rates the pop-
ulation structure vanishes and the population becomes
well-mixed, defection is the favorable strategy according
to the social dilemma [45].
However, selective group extinction greatly increases
the robustness of the degree of cooperation against the
migration of individuals, which can be interpreted as ro-
bustness against mixing or diffusive noise: the migration
rate which leads to diverging (b/c)⋆ is smaller by a factor
of approximately two λd = qN(M−2). Increased robust-
ness of cooperation in conditions of increased mixing can
therefore be a noticeable advantage for the evolution of
cooperation with selective group extinction.
Several factors not included into the current model
might influence the effect of selective group extinction:
Firstly, a non-linear group fitness function can have a
strong impact on the fixation probability. Our analyti-
cal results do not depend on the particular shape of the
group fitness function which we chose to be linear, since
in case of a group splitting event we assume all groups
to be homogeneous. For higher group splitting probabil-
ities, however, the particular shape of the group fitness
function does matter and a plethora of interesting effects
might be observable dependent on the particular choice
of the fitness function [46, 47].
Secondly a variable size of groups might have beneficial
effects on the evolution of cooperation by group selection.
Groups with more cooperators will grow faster which in
turn increases the share of cooperators in the population
and increases the frequency pure cooperator groups after
group splitting.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, direct selection between groups via se-
lective group extinction substantially lowers the criti-
cal cost-to-benefit ratio (b/c)⋆ both as a function of the
group size N , the number of groupsM and the migration
probability λ. In game theory and evolutionary dynam-
ics the establishment and maintenance of cooperation is
generically a threshold phenomenon [3, 48]. Thus, any
substantial change in the threshold is expected to have
rather a drastic effect. For instance, given a fixed benefit
b, a change of the cost c of 20% usually crucially deter-
mines the establishment and maintenance of cooperation,
both in simple and more complex social and economic
systems [1, 48–50]. In our model, depending on the cir-
cumstances and compared with the TN model, the low-
ering of (b/c)⋆ is in the range of 50 to 80%, which con-
stitutes our main result. Thus, our results indicate that
selective group extinction substantially promotes the ad-
vantageous effects of group selection for cooperation. Se-
lective group extinction might contribute to group selec-
tion in social behavior of animals or plants [51], cultural
and economic behavior of humans [52] or even coopera-
tive effects in the microbial world [53].
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